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Abstract
Scenario Analysis is a risk assessment tool that aims to evaluate the
impact of a small number of distinct plausible future scenarios. In
this paper, we provide an overview of important aspects of Scenario
Analysis including when it is appropriate, the design of scenarios, un-
certainty and encouraging creativity. Each of these issues is discussed
in the context of climate, energy and legal scenarios.
1 Introduction
Scenario analysis (SA) is a technique that assesses the impact of a small set of
distinct scenarios, with the aim of gaining insight into how the future might
evolve under different defined conditions. The rationale of SA differs from
that of forecasting in that scenarios are not extrapolations of the past but are
built on certain plausible underlying assumptions about the future. Stress
testing, a term which is often used interchangeably with SA, is a similar
concept. However, the aim is to consider extreme scenarios in order to assess
the effects of unlikely but high impact events.
The aim of this paper is discuss various aspects of SA and to relate them
to three areas of application. We do not claim to offer a coherent theory of
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scenarios, as, to some extent, the field is still developing. However, we hope
that this paper will go some way towards its development. The three areas
of application are (A) climate, (B) energy and (C) litigation in insurance,
and these will be referenced where appropriate. For (A), we focus on the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s Representative Concentration
Pathways [47], which assume different concentrations of greenhouse gases in
the earth’s atmosphere. For (B), we use on the UK National Grid’s Future
Energy Scenarios [11] which consider different energy futures for the UK
both in terms of decarbonisation of the economy and decentralisation of
energy production. For (C), we briefly define our own scenarios, based on
our experience from a number of projects in criminal and civil law, including
a project related to accident insurance. Details of each of these are given in
the appendix.
In the case of energy, in addition to the National Grid scenarios described
above, we draw on our own experience on two European projects in the area
of district heating [1, 14] and from individual research projects consolidated
at the Alan Turing Institute, particularly the project Managing Uncertainty
in Government Modelling (MUGM) [7]. For the litigation case, we exploit
our experience working with a number of parties interested in dealing with
uncertainty surrounding the development and uptake of driverless cars.
Purposes of SA can broadly be placed into two different categories. In the
first, often referred to as Scenario Planning, the aim is to assess which future
events are plausible and what knock-on effects they might have and to en-
courage planners to think about the future and what risks and opportunities
they capture. This way of thinking is common in disaster planning, for exam-
ple. The second use of scenarios is in decision making in which scenarios are
used to aid a specific decision. For example, in energy planning, the impact
of different levels of future energy demand might be considered.
SA is considered by many organisations to be an important tool in the
evaluation of risk. The UK Government’s Green Book, which provides guid-
ance on how to appraise and evaluate policies and projects, recommends SA
for ‘significant future uncertainties’ caused by potential technical, economic
and political issues [44]. The UK Government’s Aqua Book, which provides
guidance for producing analysis for government, recommends that analytical
models should be tested ‘under a variety of scenarios’ [43]. The European
Union has also made use of scenarios in its energy planning. The 2011 EU
Energy Roadmap defined a set of scenarios targeting the reduction of green-
house gas emissions by 80 percent or more by 2050 [25]. Other examples of
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organisations that recommend or use SA are the European Chemicals Agency
[17] and the European Food Safety authority [22].
Scenario planning has been used in a wide variety of different fields and
has a considerable history. In 1973, Peter deLeon of the Rand Corporation
wrote a report detailing his experiences of using scenarios in ‘games’ centred
around political and military situations [27]. The games were designed with
two ‘teams’ who were faced against each other and a game-manager in charge
of setting various scenarios for the teams. The main aim of the games was
to put people in unpredictable positions and therefore to encourage them to
practice their decision making in a challenging environment.
In climate science, the level of future greenhouse gas emissions is a major
uncertainty that depends on a range of political and societal aspects. Given
the unpredictable nature of human behaviour, SA is a useful tool in this
context because it allows the impacts of climate change to be assessed in
multiple settings. Rather than attempting to predict future behaviour, the
approach is simply to assess the impact were the assumptions under each
scenario to emerge.
In fact, scenarios have been used in climate science for a number of decades.
A 1988 study assessed the impact of three emissions scenarios on global and
local temperatures [29]. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) first produced its IS92 scenarios in 1992 and these were presented
in the second IPCC assessment report. IS92 consists of six scenarios each
featuring differing assumptions regarding economic, social and environmental
conditions [32]. Later, in 2000, the IPCC’s ‘Special Report on Emissions
Scenarios’ (SRES) was produced and designed to improve on a number of
aspects of the IS92 scenarios such as the assumed nature of global economic
restructuring and the rate of technological change [40]. The SRES were
superseded in 2014 by Representative Concentration Pathways (RCP) [47]
which are defined on the basis of different radiative forcings, that is the effect
of increased emissions on the make up of the atmosphere, rather than actual
greenhouse gas emissions. The RCP scenarios are described in the appendix.
SA is rather less common in the legal context. However, the Hague Insti-
tute for Innovation of Law (HiiL), a social enterprise that aims to increase
the accessibility of the justice system, has produced a report entitled ‘Law
Scenarios to 2030’ which explores possible scenarios for the global legal in-
dustry. In that report, the four scenarios are differentiated on the basis of
different levels of internationalisation (i.e. to what extent laws are made in-
ternationally) and whether laws and regulations are predominantly decided
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at a state or private level. It is acknowledge in the report that scenarios are
‘relatively unknown as a working tool for lawyers and jurists’. However, the
value of scenarios as a tool to ‘allow for uncertainty and account for it’ is
argued, underpinning the potential value of SA in this area.
SA is widely used in the planning and construction of infrastructure projects.
For example, downscaled climate projections have been used as scenarios
when considering the impact of flooding [34] and future demand for air con-
ditioning [6]. Another well known set of scenarios are defined by Shells Global
Business Environment team which produces different scenarios of future en-
ergy supply and demand using their Global Supply Model [12]. The Shell
scenarios differ in their underlying assumptions regarding hard-to-forecast
factors such as geopolitical events and improvements in technology. As dis-
cussed further in the appendix, the UK National Grid also annually produces
future energy scenarios on behalf of the UK Government [11]. Details of the
scenarios are disseminated to the public and are available online [10]. The
EU Reference Scenario produces its own energy scenarios which are typically
used in decision making for EU-wide initiatives [4]. SA has also been used in
the context of District Heating and Cooling (DHC). For example, in [8], four
scenarios were defined to assess the effects of greater energy price volatility
and improvements in thermal storage on the future prospects of a district
heating scheme in Bor˚as, Sweden.
2 Good practice
The following sections each relate to different aspects of SA and we discuss
what we believe to be good practice in each case. The aim is then to pro-
vide some views on applying SA in practical decision making. Each one is
discussed separately with reference to the climate, energy and legal scenarios
defined in the appendix and in a wider context.
2.1 Designing scenarios
An important aspect of SA concerns the underlying basis on which scenarios
are designed. A number of approaches are taken, in practice:
1. Advantageousness: scenarios are defined in terms of how advantageous
or unfavourable each one would be if it came to fruition. For example,
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scenarios labelled optimistic, pessimistic and neutral might be defined.
This has been done in the context of assessing the future prevalence of
smoking [20], for example.
2. Event based: scenarios are defined based on the occurrence or nature
of some underlying event. For example, at the time of writing in which
Britain’s future relationship with the European Union has not been
decided following the 2016 referendum, different scenarios might be
defined to assess the impact of this uncertainty. Scenarios in this case
might be defined on the basis of different policy directions such as
Britain staying in the European single market, the negotiation of a new
customs union between the UK and the EEA or a second referendum
being held and Britain opting to remain.
3. Level based: scenarios are defined on the basis of different levels of
some quantitative variable. For example, the IPCC’s Representative
Concentration Pathways (RCPs) are defined on the basis of different
levels of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere over time. In energy plan-
ning, scenarios might be based on different future electricity prices and,
in the context of motor insurance, legal scenarios might be based on
the proportion of self-driving cars on the road over time.
Note that, whilst each of the above provides a basis for scenario design, it
is common for a combination of these to feature simultaneously within the
scenario itself. For example, consider a set of scenarios designed to assess
the viability of a district heating scheme in which one of the scenarios is that
government with a significant green agenda achieves power. Whilst such
a scenario might be considered an ‘event based’ scenario, the assumptions
that make up that scenario might be a combination of level based aspects
such as carbon taxes and event based aspects such as total bans on certain
technologies or fuels.
An important question in SA regards the number of distinct scenarios to be
considered. In order to avoid overcomplication and confusion, a maximum
of three to five is often recommended [19].
In [15], a number of conditions for effective scenario design are defined.
Whilst these are discussed in the context of climate related risk, we believe
they are useful for the design of scenarios in other contexts. Each of the
conditions are defined and described below:
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1. Plausible - a scenario should be plausible and come with a narrative
justifying each event or change in the underlying assumptions.
2. Distinctive - the different scenarios should be distinctive enough in
terms of the key factors for there to be a clear difference between them.
3. Consistent - Interaction between key factors should be taken into ac-
count. For example, macroeconomic factors may impact important
aspects of the scenarios simultaneously.
4. Relevant - each scenario should be relevant in terms of giving a specific
insight into the future (e.g. the government increases spending on green
projects and subsidies).
5. Challenging - scenarios should challenge the conventional view on
things that may affect the project in question.
Consistency is particularly important and, arguably, SA is well placed to
deal with associations between variables. In sensitivity analysis, defining
such associations can be a difficult task since they can be complex. Since
SA only considers a small number of potential pathways, it is much easier to
account for such dependencies.
Consider the following case from the energy sector. Suppose that a local
authority is considering investing in a district heating scheme but there is
an upcoming election in which a green-minded government could plausibly
win power. Whilst it is often difficult to predict government policy, there are
strong rumours that a government formed by that party plans to increase
taxation on greenhouse gas emissions and increase subsidies on renewable
energy. These are two effects caused by one underlying factor, i.e. the
election of a green-minded government. It is therefore important that these
dependencies are accounted for in the design of the scenarios.
An important question in scenario design concerns whether scenarios should
be designed with a specific decision in mind. This depends heavily on the
application. The IPCC’s Representative Concentration Pathway scenarios,
for example, are designed to assess the impact of different levels of green-
house gas emissions. As such, the decision to be made is to what extent
emissions should be reduced over this period. The National Grid’s future
energy scenarios are built for use by the UK Government in its energy plan-
ning. In both cases, however, the scenarios are in the public domain and
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available for use by anyone that wishes to use them. In the case of motor
insurance, SA is less widely used and thus general scenarios for issues like the
onset of driverless vehicles are not widely available. Therefore if an insurance
company wishes to apply SA, they will need to define the scenarios for the
specific question(s) they wish to answer. In some sense, insurance policies
are designed specifically to take into account scenarios and their risk. For
example, there is current interest as to whether climate change will affect
flood insurance.
The decision as to whether scenarios should be designed with a specific
question in mind often ultimately comes down to their intended purpose.
Generalised scenarios are often more efficient in terms of costs since they can
be reused for a range of purposes. However, designing scenarios for general
use often comes at a cost in that they are less relevant to the question at
hand.
2.2 Control
The design of scenarios is influenced by the level of control that the decision
maker has. This concept is familiar from risk management where the ability
to control a risk and to mitigate the effects of an event are critical [36].
Consider, for example, a municipality in the United Kingdom that wishes
to decide whether to proceed with a proposal for a district heating scheme.
To help understand the risks associated with the decision, they decide to
utilise the National Grid’s energy scenarios and assess their impact on the
viability of the project. Some potential elements such as government policy
are out of the control of the city whilst, for others, they have direct control.
For example, changes in the wholesale electricity price cannot be controlled
by the city and thus can only be mitigated, although ideally they should be
incorporated into mathematical modelling at the local level. Subsidies for
solar panels, on the other hand, might be in the direct control of the city.
This distinction brings up a subtle difference in potential policy actions. In
the former case, the city can only mitigate but, in the latter, the city is able
to directly impact the nature of key effects to the project of interest.
The level of control over the scenarios differs over our three examples. For
the case of the IPCC’s Representative Concentration Pathways, the level of
control clearly differs depending on who is making the decision. For example,
it could be argued that world governments as a whole have a significant level
of control over greenhouse gas emissions, national governments have some
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control and businesses have limited or no control. For the UK National
Grid’s Future Energy Scenarios, the UK government has a great deal of
control in that they are able to design policy whilst small businesses have
little control. Finally, for scenarios regarding driverless vehicles (appendix
C), the government has a high level of control should it wish to exercise it
(depending on its attitude towards regulation) whilst insurance companies
may have limited control.
2.3 Long term versus short term objectives
SA differs significantly according to the timescale of the decision to be made
or action to be taken. Similarly to forecasting, the longer the time horizon
of interest, the more uncertainty. In the design of long term scenarios, such
as in climate science in which scenarios can reach fifty years or more into
the future, it can be extremely difficult to identify plausible pathways. It is
much easier for short term objectives, on the other hand, since one can more
readily imagine how events might develop. This is particularly true when the
same decision is made repeatedly. Consider, for example, a case in which the
objective is to ensure that a country is able to meet energy demand over the
following two-year period. This is a decision that is likely to have been made
regularly but is still subject to qualitative factors such as political changes
or geophysical risks.
2.4 Scenarios and expert judgement
Scenario design is a challenging process that can involve the identification of
unprecedented future events. This often requires a great deal of creativity and
insight that may only be achievable with the input of experts in the field. The
benefit of asking experts to help design scenarios is twofold. First, asking an
independent party to design a set of scenarios separates scenario design from
scenario planning. This discourages the tendency to design scenarios that
planners are already familiar with and are confident that they can handle.
Second, an expert may be better equipped to identify a wide range of different
possible scenarios and, as a result, planners and decision makers should be
in a better position to deal with future events.
The observation that important aspects of scenarios in Scenario Planning
can be neglected is one that has been made by other authors. Referring to
this issue, according to [39],
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‘This can be critical for organisations if it leads to an inertia in internal
judgement, resulting in blind spots or a failure to see weak signals in the firms
periphery.’
In that paper, a methodology is described with which to integrate
external expert judgement into Scenario Planning.
Expert judgement can also play a role in estimating probabilities or ranking
the likelihood of different scenarios. This is particularly true in estimating
probabilities of qualitative events that are hard to model. Expert judgement,
in this setting, typically involves the estimation of a probability distribution
by one or more experts in a field. When multiple experts are involved, the
question of how to incorporate all of this information into a decision or prob-
ability estimate is an important one. The Sheffield Elicitation Framework
(SHELF) [28] provides extensive guidance on elicitation of probabilities from
multiple experts. Under the framework, multiple experts are asked to form
independent probability estimates. These then forms the basis of discussions
between the experts, after which an impartial observer forms a ‘consensus’
distribution.
A concern during expert elicitation is that the experts themselves may be
poorly calibrated, that is, despite their expertise, they are typically unable to
form accurate probabilities. Roger Cooke’s classical model [26] asks experts
to provide judgement on past events in which the outcome is not revealed
[24]. This allows for the ability of each expert to be assessed and potentially
recalibrated to remove biases. In theory, this approach could be extended
to assess the probabilities of each scenario in SA, though some qualitative
approach may also be needed.
In disaster planning, the job of building scenarios is often given to a set of
experts who then present those scenarios to decision makers who are asked to
assess the effects and, crucially, suggest potential mitigating action. This is
commonly done in the planning for a potential nuclear accident, for example.
The State-of-the-Art Reactor Consequence Analyses (SOARCA) project has
been set up by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission to provide realistic
scenarios regarding potential nuclear reactor accidents [13]. Users are able
to define scenarios based on their likelihood of occurrence whilst computer
modelling is used to predict how a reactor might behave under such conditions
[9].
Many examples of expert judgement in SA can be found in the scientific
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literature. For example, subjective probabilities were elicited from multiple
experts regarding the risk to participants in the annual Pamplona bull run in
Spain [37]. Expert Judgement was also used in [30] in the form of the Delphi
method to combine the judgement of 30 CEOs of service providers to design
scenarios for the logistics industry up to 2025.
2.5 Creativity and scenarios
Effective risk assessment requires creativity in order to identify potential
future risks, particularly if the timescales are long. This is particularly im-
portant in disaster risk management where risks are constantly emerging and,
if ignored, can be highly damaging. The importance of creativity is summed
up by the title of Herman Kahn’s book ‘Thinking About The Thinkable’
which, in his case, largely focuses on scenarios of potential nuclear conflict
[35].
A variety of different techniques can be used to encourage decision makers to
be creative when identifying potential risks. One way to encourage creativity
is to try and immerse people in a situation as much as possible so that they
can more readily imagine potential risks or opportunities. The use of games
by the Rand Corporation in the 1970s was designed to give participants a
stake in the decision to incentivise them to think carefully as to how the
situation might develop [27].
The onset of modern technology has enabled far more realistic depictions of
reality. Virtual Scenario Planning [38], in which participants are placed into
a virtual reality world and asked to make decisions in real time, is growing
quickly in popularity. One of the main advantages of Virtual Scenario Plan-
ning is that it enables participants to visualise different scenarios, creating
a far more immersive experience than one in which the situation is simply
described. Potential use of virtual reality in the planning of smart cities is
reviewed in [33].
The use of scenarios to enhance creativity has strong analogies with the use
of conceptual design in areas such as architecture and product development.
3 Uncertainty
A key question in SA is whether scenarios should come with a probabilistic
estimate attached. The plausibility of doing this depends on a number of
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factors. One problem is that is often difficult to design scenarios that span
the probability space, that is provide an exhaustive set of possible outcomes.
Probabilities in this case are ill-defined.
Consider, for example, a set of energy scenarios in which the electricity price
is a factor. Typically, in each scenario, a price would be defined as a function
of time. In reality, it is highly unlikely that the electricity price would develop
exactly as described in any of the scenarios and therefore placing a probability
on any of them would be a difficult and, arguably, meaningless task. One
way in which to attempt to avoid this situation is to define scenarios using
different defined levels of some variable. For example, energy scenarios could
be defined with a “high”, “medium” or “low” electricity price. This causes
further complexities, however, as the question of how these translate into
model parameters is hard to answer.
Even with a set of scenarios that span the probability space, assessing the
probability of each can be extremely difficult, particularly when long time
scales are considered. Dependencies between scenario elements can quickly
make the calculations complex and probabilities inaccurate. In many cases,
the value of placing a probability on a scenario is questionable.
In some cases, the decision maker has some control over how a scenario
develops. This can make things even more complex since the probabilities
of each scenario are impacted by the actions taken by the decision maker.
Whilst this effect complicates matters, it should be noted that real option
theory aims to answer the question of how to deal with such situations [45].
Given the difficulty of assigning probabilities to scenarios, it is interesting
to consider how the results should be presented in a decision making context.
Inevitably, a decision maker will want to gain some insight into the relative
likelihood of each scenario. If this is not possible, analysis can be performed
under each scenario and the results presented for each one separately. Discus-
sion of the relative likelihood can then take place. In some cases, the decision
maker themselves may be informed enough to have their own insight on the
matter. One simple way of presenting the relative likelihood of each scenario
is to rank them in order of their plausibility.
The IPCC’s Representative Concentration Pathways do not come with prob-
ability statements attached. This is likely because of the difficulty of pre-
dicting the political and social behaviour of humans over a long period of
time. However, there is also another explanation in that, since the IPCC is
an organisation set up between national governments, the likelihood of each
scenario is dependent on the impact of the scenarios themselves.
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The UK National Grid does not provide probability statements regarding
scenarios. In 2014, its outlook manager Gary Dolphin stated [3] that
‘We do not apply probabilities to any of our scenarios. We like to believe
each scenario is equally plausible and that they collectively define an envelope
within which the true future lies.’
One could argue, however, that stating that each scenario is equally
plausible endorses the view that none should be treated as any more likely
than any other.
In our view, the mutually enhancing relationship between uncertainty and
SA is likely to be fruitful. Although uncertainty remains an opaque and
ill-defined subject, it is commonly agreed that there is a gap to be filled
between formal probabilistic methods and non-probabilistic methods such as
those used in areas in which there is ‘radical uncertainty’ [2]. It seems to
us that SA provides a useful contribution to closing this gap. A simple, but
possibly attractive, way of thinking about these matters is that there are
two broad categories of uncertainty: one containing SA, global sensitivity
and long term forecasting and the other a much better developed area of
local sensitivity and short term decision making.
4 Scenarios and model error
Scenarios are typically used to test the effects of different model input as-
sumptions on model output. It is now generally agreed that no mathematical
model can perfectly represent the behaviour of the world and therefore can
never be expected to provide perfect predictions of future events. In SA, there
would therefore be an inevitable discrepancy between model output and the
real world, even if the assumptions developed exactly as defined under the
scenario. This discrepancy can be particularly large when unusual scenarios
are considered. In such cases, the model may be ill-suited to providing real-
istic projections. SA can, in fact, help to uncover weaknesses of models. If
a set of scenario assumptions in a model provide clearly unintuitive results,
this may provoke a closer look at the model to attempt to understand the
cause.
Consider, for example, a case in which SA is used to assess the effects of a
long electricity outage. If the aim is to assess the effects of such an outage
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occurring on a weekday but the model is built on the basis that it occurs on
a weekend, given that society’s behaviour is typically different on weekends
and weekdays, the model is unlikely to be fit for purpose. The discrepancy
between the model output and what might be expected to happen intuitively
may, however, be able to uncover this model inadequacy.
Ideally, a mathematical model of a physical, social, economic or environ-
mental activity would incorporate the facility to model all scenarios thought
likely. This is probably economically infeasible but it is recommended that
models are built in modular form so that, as new scenarios come into view,
the model can be extended. Having a legacy model which cannot deal with
an important scenario is inflexible. Insurance companies needing estimates of
increasing precipitation due to climate change leading to runoff from moun-
tains will not be impressed if the mountains are not included in the climate
models.
5 Scenarios in decision making
Perhaps the most important issue in SA is how scenarios can be used to make
decisions. If the scenarios span the probability space and accurate probabil-
ities of each scenario can be calculated, the expected cost or utility can be
found using standard methods. A decision can then be made that optimises
the variable. In practice, as described above, it is often unreasonable, and
sometimes even ill-defined, to assign probabilities to each outcome. In that
case, this approach is not feasible.
Scenarios are sometimes defined as different pathways to achieve some de-
fined goal. This can then provide a range of options for policy making. An
example of scenarios defined in this way can be found in the Greater London
Authority’s 1.5C Compatible Climate Action Plan [16]. In that, four differ-
ent scenarios are defined by which the goal of a carbon neutral London by
2050 can be expected to be achieved.
At the time of writing, plans are being drawn up by the Bank of England to
require businesses to test the impact of different climate scenarios including
a ‘business as usual’ scenario in which greenhouse gas emissions are not
significantly curtailed, and one in which the UK Government achieves its
aim of transitioning to a carbon neutral state by 2050. It is not clear at this
stage what conditions will be imposed on businesses but there will likely be a
direct impact on decision making. The requirement to use sensible scenarios
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may be added to corporate governance rules.
The allocation of probabilities to scenarios places the theory within the area
of multiple modelling, either Bayesian or non-Bayesian. This is very close
to metamodelling which grew out of a need to handle multiple models, for
example run by different laboratories or research groups, on essentially the
same entities. The analogy is strong because, if all scenarios are housed
within a single metamodel, then they can be represented by different levels
of inputs. Another strong analogy stems from saying that scenario analysis
is a type of global sensitivity in which inputs, or even structural aspects of
the model may be changed, as opposed to local sensitivity analysis where
inputs are varied around some central or nominal value. The analysis is close
to a multi-level analysis with the indicator of the scenarios providing another
level to which all the individual scenario models are attached.
In a Bayesian context, the judgement of the probability of the occurrence
of a particular scenario has the status of a prior probability. Then, at least
theoretically, the probabilities can be updated as the future develops and
further data arise. Indeed, should one or more scenarios seem more likely
then one could alter data collection to concentrate on them.
In this regard, there is a flavour of play-the-winner-rules which have a long
history in statistical decision theory. The theory which covers the Bayesian
approach is usually called Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). This is a good
label because it describes how the model behaves: the metamodel parameter
estimates are essentially posterior averages of posterior model estimates. Al-
though coherent in a Bayesian fashion, it may not be appropriate to model
the real world as an average of several ‘worlds’. If the scenarios are mutually
exclusive, then, at most, only one will occur and this will not then be an
average. In fact,if the scenarios are non-exhaustive, it may be that none of
them occur. In such a case, we may put a prior probability on a ‘something
else’ scenario. Classical non Bayesian meta-analysis is more like multiple hy-
pothesis testing, in which quantities such as false error rates and similar are
studied. It is important in medicine where one of a number of different drugs
may be efficacious. This is a world in which one proceeds as if a particular
hypothesis is true such as marketing the best drug for some ailment. After
all, in emergency situations, one has to do something and even doing nothing
is doing something.
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5.1 Least Worst Regret
In decision theory, regret is the emotional reaction to information about
the best course of action after having taken a decision. Least Worst
Regret (LWR) is an approach in which decisions are made with the
aim of minimising regret. An often argued benefit of LWR is that the
probabilities of each scenario are not required. Regret is defined as the
difference in cost between the decision taken and the optimal decision.
The difference is ‘regretful’ since, with a decision, the cost could have
been lower. In its Electricity Market Reform Report 2015 [18], the Na-
tional Grid echos the clam that probabilities are not required by stating that:
‘One benefit of this approach is that it is independent of the probabilities
of the various potential future outcomes and therefore it can be used when the
probabilities of these outcomes are unknown, providing that the cases considered
cover a range of credible outcomes.’
LWR is built around the principal that humans tend to be risk averse
and seek to avoid regret as much as possible [21]. This idea is closely
linked to Prospect Theory in behavioural economics which describes how the
negative utility from a perceived loss tends to be higher than the positive
utility from the equivalent gain. Regret is a powerful emotion with strong
psychological effects that can have a big effect on a human. The effect of
regret can also be significant for an organisation where the risk of being
responsible for a big ‘missed opportunity’ can be high.
It has been argued that the ability of LWR to aid useful decision making
depends on a number of factors such as the cost function, the decision to
be made and the probability of each scenario and thus should not be used
uncritically and without careful consideration of these factors [48].
In our opinion, the evidence justifying the use of LWR is weak. The avoid-
ance of discomfort to the decision makers that result from cognitive biases
is not a sound basis for making a decision, nor is the seemingly deliber-
ate attempt to avoid attaching probabilities to scenarios. Likewise, whilst,
inevitably, reputational issues will almost certainly have an impact in deci-
sion making, it seems odd to embed the biases of the decision maker in the
methodology behind the decision itself. Arguably, it would be much better
for the decision maker to focus on justifying their decision more scientifically.
Another criticism of LWR is that it can discourage the consideration of
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unlikely scenarios since there is nothing in LWR that requires differentiation
between the likelihood of each one. If a scenario is omitted because it is
considered to be unlikely, some assumption about the likelihood of a scenario
has effectively already been incorporated into the decision. The question of
how that information can be used better then inevitably arises.
6 Discussion
There is no doubt that the use of scenarios is gaining ground and that this
can be attributed to a generalised anxiety concerning the future. This is
happening at a national and local level, and in many sectors from how cli-
mate change might affect flooding to sources of volatility in financial markets.
Perhaps the most important question is how SA is actually to be used in or
adapted for real decision making. The authors have a particular interest in
the relationship between scenarios and mainstream mathematical and statis-
tical modelling. It is tempting to put probabilities onto scenarios but there
are at least two difficulties. First, the scenarios may not comprehensively
fill out the space of possibilities. Second, probability is seen by some as an
inappropriate tool in areas where probabilities become possibilities and the
data aren’t available to do detailed modelling.
Despite these problems, there remains some obvious distinctions. For exam-
ple, there are scenarios which cover events over which we may have no control
and those which are firmly part of short or long term strategies. In the first
case, we may only be left with mitigation and, in the second, where we have
control, we still will have technical and technical, political and, today, ethical
problems to overcome. It is surprising how many of the scenarios are com-
mon across different sectors. This is because there are some that affect us
all, particularly those related to climate change and allocation of resources
in what may be a future with increased scarcity.
There is, as yet, no really coherent theory of scenarios, despite the fact that
they are in increasing use. One is reminded of a time when quality, reliability
and risk were incorporated into management, with departments, champions,
high level responsibility and training. Risk, for example, is incorporated into
corporate governance, and the black belts of quality improvements remain
with us. The use of scenarios reminds one of the early days of other soft
system methodologies. With risk, for example, we have fairly soft system
management, but also heavy duty, model based methodologies in structural
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engineering and finance. Today, we have the same issue with scenarios. On
the one hand, their use as a fairly soft management tool and, on the other, as
we have suggested, their incorporation in stress testing mathematical models
in decision support. Whether or not we are able to produce a coherent
methodology, there is no doubt that companies, institutions and governments
should make scenarios part of their organisational culture. Just as we are
familiar with the quality and safety cultures, we need to have a scenario
culture, which is always by our side and affects our behaviour. Scenarios
are a systems issue and, in developing and modelling the system, should be
part of the structure. Whether or not we put probabilities on them, they
should form part of the foundation for our thinking. A scenario culture will
concentrate the mind and particularly the imagination on what might occur
and what we do or do not have control over. Like a safe driver, always
attentive to what may happen as the road unfolds before them.
A Scenarios in practice
The following sections describe the three sets of scenarios referred to in this
paper.
IPCC Representative Concentration Pathways
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines four scenar-
ios on the basis of trajectories of radiative forcing in the Earth’s atmosphere
caused by emissions of greenhouse gases [47]. Scenarios were first produced
on this basis in 2014 and replaced the scenarios defined in the Special Report
on Emissions Scenarios first published in 2000. The scenarios are differen-
tiated based on different assumed radiative forcing values in 2100. In each
scenario, a pathway defining level of radiative forcing in the years up to 2100
is defined. Each scenario is summarised below.
RCP2.6
RCP2.6 [46] is considered to be a best case scenario in terms of radiative
forcing levels created by carbon emissions. Under this scenario, radiative
forcing levels peak in 2040 at 3.1W/m2 and gradually fall to 2.6W/m2 by
2100. To achieve this, very significant and ambitious reductions in carbon
emissions would be required.
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RCP4.5
RCP4.5 is a scenario in which radiative forcing reaches a peak of 4.5W/m2
in 2100 and stabilises shortly after [23]. To reach this target, it is believed
that significant switches in energy use to electricity would be required along
with other lower emissions technologies and carbon capture [42].
RCP6
RCP6 is a scenario in which growth in green technology and strategies enable
the radiative forcing to stay below 6.0W/m2 until 2100 and stabilise shortly
after [31]. The scenario is designed to represent a case in which levels of
emissions are intermediate. Over this period, there is still heavy reliance
on fossil fuels, there is intermediate energy intensity and increasing use of
croplands. Emissions peak in 2060 at 75 percent above today’s level and
reduce to 25 percent above by 2100.
RCP8.5
RCP8.5 represents a scenario in which global greenhouse gas emissions con-
tinue to grow up to 2100 leading to extremely high radiative forcing [41]. The
scenario is designed to represent a case in which there are no policy changes
aimed at reducing emissions. Under the scenario, greenhouse gas emissions
are three times that of today’s with a high reliance on fossil fuels, population
increase and a low rate of technology development.
National Grid Scenarios
The UK National Grid defines energy scenarios on a yearly basis for use in
government policy and for other energy planning [5]. Previous to 2018, the
scenarios were based on different levels of economic growth and government
effort to decarbonise. In 2018, a different approach was taken in which each
scenario was defined with different assumptions about the level of decen-
tralisation and the speed of decarbonisation. Each of the four scenarios is
summarised below:
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B.1. Community Renewables
Under this scenario, a relatively high level of decentralisation is assumed.
The UK government’s commitment to reduce carbon emissions by eighty
percent by 2050 is met. There is extensive use of smart technology to man-
age peak loads and energy efficiency improves such that EU targets are met.
The government succeeds in its target to end all sales of petrol and diesel
powered cars and electrical vehicles become the most popular form of pri-
vate transportation. For heavy goods vehicles, significant progress is made
towards replacing natural gas with hydrogen. Significant changes regarding
the heating of homes have been made and heat pumps are the dominant
technology. There is also a significant role for district heating. Electricity
supply is dominated by solar and wind power, combined with efficient stor-
age. Gas is still important in the short to medium term but is eventually
largely replaced with green gas.
B.2. Two Degrees
The Two Degrees scenario meets the UK government’s targets of reducing the
carbon emissions by 80 percent by switching to larger and more centralised
technologies. Under this scenario, electricity demand is greatly reduced due
to hydrogen heating. Electrical appliances are generally much more energy
efficient. Electric vehicles become the most popular mode of private trans-
port whilst demand for public transport also grows. Hydrogen powered com-
mercial vehicles, replacing natural gas powered vehicles, also become more
widespread. A large effort is made to improve the thermal efficiency of homes
whilst the dominant heat sources are gas boilers, district heating and heat
pumps. Energy generation, primarily from wind and nuclear, is based on the
transmission network itself, improving efficiency. North Sea gas still plays an
important role and some green gas is available.
B.3. Steady Progression
Under this scenario, the government’s 2050 decarbonisation target is not
met but steady progress is made. Improvements in the energy efficiency of
appliances and the electrification of heat is slower than under the Community
Renewables and Two Degrees scenarios but there is a large increase in the
number of electric vehicles, giving an important role to smart technology in
managing peak demand. Gas powered vehicles continue to play an important
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role in the commercial sector. Most homes still rely on the use of gas boilers
and there is little improvement in energy efficiency or the use of heat pumps.
Electricity is generally generated on a large scale, rather than locally but
there is development of nuclear power and offshore wind. Gas still plays an
important role with shale gas providing the majority of the supply.
Civil Litigation and Insurance
Technological innovation in the automotive industry is concerning drivers,
insurers and their respective legal representatives. At a general level, the
rapid increase in electrical and/or driverless vehicles is the subject of much
discussion. At one end, it is an example of the risks on technological change.
Another such example is the possible psychological damage from social media
and online gambling.
In collaboration with partners, the authors have been discussing the advent
of driverless cars. One issue, for example, is duty of care which is an ingre-
dient in the definition of liability if there is an accident. Who is liable, the
driver or the designer of the vehicle? Below, we list a number of scenarios,
drawing on our own discussion and rather recent research in the area.
C.1.
Uptake of driverless cars is low but this leads to an increase in the accident
rate and a large number of expensive lawsuits concerning responsibility. This
leads to insurance premiums that are prohibitively expensive for many. As a
result, public opinion turns against driverless cars and a movement develops
for more heavy regulation and/or a complete ban.
C.2
Uptake of driverless cars is moderate and well regulated and the accident
rate stays largely the same. A clear legal framework is set out regarding
the apportioning of responsibility for accidents and insurance premiums are
similar for both driverless and human-driven cars.
C.3
Driverless cars are perceived as safe by the general public and public good ar-
guments are used by regulators to allow their widespread introduction. This
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leads to a sharp decrease in accidents and insurance premiums are cheaper
as a result. Human-driven cars are predicted by many to be obsolete within
a decade.
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